Review of Imogen Dickie, Fixing Reference by Jones, Nicholas
 
 
Review of Imogen Dickie, Fixing Reference
Jones, Nicholas
DOI:
10.1017/S0031819116000504
License:
None: All rights reserved
Document Version
Peer reviewed version
Citation for published version (Harvard):
Jones, N 2017, 'Review of Imogen Dickie, Fixing Reference', Philosophy, vol. 92, no. 1.
https://doi.org/10.1017/S0031819116000504
Link to publication on Research at Birmingham portal
Publisher Rights Statement:
Eligibility for repository: Checked on 12/10/2016
General rights
Unless a licence is specified above, all rights (including copyright and moral rights) in this document are retained by the authors and/or the
copyright holders. The express permission of the copyright holder must be obtained for any use of this material other than for purposes
permitted by law.
•	Users may freely distribute the URL that is used to identify this publication.
•	Users may download and/or print one copy of the publication from the University of Birmingham research portal for the purpose of private
study or non-commercial research.
•	User may use extracts from the document in line with the concept of ‘fair dealing’ under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 (?)
•	Users may not further distribute the material nor use it for the purposes of commercial gain.
Where a licence is displayed above, please note the terms and conditions of the licence govern your use of this document.
When citing, please reference the published version.
Take down policy
While the University of Birmingham exercises care and attention in making items available there are rare occasions when an item has been
uploaded in error or has been deemed to be commercially or otherwise sensitive.
If you believe that this is the case for this document, please contact UBIRA@lists.bham.ac.uk providing details and we will remove access to
the work immediately and investigate.
Download date: 01. Feb. 2019
Nicholas K. Jones (n.k.jones@bham.ac.uk) 1 
Review of Imogen Dickie, Fixing Reference 
Imogen Dickie (2015), Fixing Reference. OUP. £37.50 hardback. ISBN 978-0-19-875561-6. 
The final version of this review is due to appear in Philosophy. 
Imogen Dickie’s Fixing Reference articulates a novel and interesting thesis about reference-
determination for certain of our mental states, focussing in particular on belief.1 Consider a 
subject who believes that Obama is president. This belief refers to, or is about, Obama. This 
is not a brute fact. So in virtue of what is the belief about Obama, rather than anything else, 
or even about nothing at all? Dickie’s answer has two components. 
The first component is a thesis Dickie calls Reference and Justification, introduced in chapter 
2. To understand the thesis, we need two ideas. The first is Dickie’s notion of proprietary 
justification for a belief. This is a form of justification that the belief’s subject treats as 
overriding or trumping other forms of justification for contrary beliefs. Dickie offers three 
examples. (1) For perceptual demonstrative beliefs <F(that)>,2 the proprietary justification is 
uptake from a perceptual connection with an object. (2) For name-based beliefs <F(NN)>, 
the proprietary justification is careful uptake from testimony. (3) For description-based 
beliefs <F(DD)>, where “DD” is a name introduced for the G, the proprietary justification is 
inference from <F(the G)>. The second idea we need to understand Reference and 
Justification is that of a body of belief, i.e. a collection of a given subject’s beliefs. Reference 
and Justification concerns bodies of beliefs; it determines, for a given body, a referent for all 
the beliefs in it. Although Dickie is not explicit about how the relevant bodies are 
individuated, the idea appears to be that (a) each body contains beliefs of exactly one of the 
three kinds just mentioned, and (b) each body comprises all of the subject’s beliefs involving 
the same perceptual demonstrative, or name, or descriptive name.3 We can now state 
Reference and Justification. Roughly, it says: for any body B of beliefs and ordinary object o, 
the beliefs in B are about o iff, for any belief b in B, if the subject S has proprietary 
justification for b that renders b rational, then (i) S is not merely lucky that b is true, if o has 
1 The relevant states are restricted in at least three respects. (1) They are all beliefs. (2) Their 
referents are all ordinary objects, i.e. roughly: space-filling, causally unified, macroscopic 
individuals. (3) They all predicate one monadic property of one object, unlike relational and 
logically complex beliefs. 
2 I follow Dickie’s notation in using angle brackets to denote constituents of mental states, 
so that, e.g., “<F>” denotes a concept representing the property F. 
3 A complication: demonstratives, names, and descriptive names are linguistic entities, not 
constituents of mental states like beliefs. Those states are, however, correctly reportable 
using demonstratives, names, and descriptive names. Dickie hypothesises that distinct kinds 
of belief correspond to these distinct kinds of linguistic expression. 
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the property predicated of an object in b, and (ii) S is unlucky that b is false, if o lacks the 
property predicated of an object in b.4 
The second component of Dickie’s view is the subject of chapter 3: the thesis that we have a 
need to represent things outside of ourselves. By a “need”, Dickie means a kind of 
motivational, or goal-setting, mental state much like an intention. Needs differ from 
intentions only in that they lack conceptual content, in the sense that a subject can need to 
Φ despite lacking the concept <Φ>. (Example: a newborn infant may need to feed despite 
lacking the concept <feed> and hence being unable to articulate <feed>-involving thoughts.) 
Dickie hypothesises that we each have a need to represent objects in the external world. In 
chapter 3, Dickie also develops an account of justification on which a subject’s behaviour, 
including belief-forming behaviour, can count as justified by virtue of being a skilful means 
towards satisfaction of a motivational state. Combining this account of justification with the 
need to represent external objects, Dickie obtains a novel account of the justification for 
certain of our beliefs: they’re justified because forming them is a skilful means toward 
satisfying our need to represent external objects. I discuss this idea further below. Given 
Reference and Justification, this account of justification for the relevant beliefs is also an 
account of reference-determination for them. 
Once this framework is in place, Dickie considers three applications of it: perceptual 
demonstrative belief (chapter 4); description-based belief (chapter 5); proper name-based 
belief (chapter 6). Chapter 7 continues the discussion of description-based thought, locating 
Dickie’s approach relative to some rivals and arguing that it yields genuinely object-
dependent description-based thought. Chapter 8 concludes by considering the role of 
subjective consciousness within Dickie’s framework. 
To my mind, the book articulates an interesting and promising approach to reference-
determination. Dickie’s discussion is nuanced, sophisticated, and full of interesting ideas. 
My main criticism is that it often feels unnecessarily difficult to figure out exactly what those 
ideas are, and how they all fit together. Dickie’s formulations can feel somewhat 
longwinded and cumbersome, in a way that sometimes obscures the precise point she’s 
trying to make. And I often found myself lost in the dialectic, wondering why this is being 
discussed here, and why it matters to the overall picture (though perhaps that merely 
reflects my own inadequacies rather than the book’s). That’s a shame because the book 
contains much of value. 
I now discuss Dickie’s account of reference-determination for perceptual demonstratives, 
focussing on her account of how perception justifies perceptual demonstrative belief. 
4 Several refinements and precisifications of this idea are discussed in chapter 2. 
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Chapter 3 explicates a notion of justification applicable to behaviour. The behaviour of a 
subject S is strongly justified by intention iff, for some Φ:5 
(A) S intends to Φ. 
(B) That intention determines how S behaves. 
(C) S is skilled in Φ-ing, so that the resulting behaviour is a reliable means towards S Φ-
ing. 
Chapter 4 uses strong justification in an account of how ordinary perception justifies 
perceptual demonstrative beliefs formed on the basis of it, e.g., my belief that that is a cup, 
looking at a cup-like entity on the table before me. Given Reference and Justification, this 
account of how perception justifies perceptual demonstrative beliefs is central to Dickie’s 
account of reference-determination for them. I will argue, however, that Dickie slides 
unwarrantedly from strong justification of belief-forming behaviour to justification of the 
beliefs resulting from it. I close by suggesting a way to fix this problem, by adopting a richer 
conception of the mind’s “need to represent things outside itself” that Dickie claims 
motivates belief-formation in response to perception. 
In chapter 4 (esp. 4.3), Dickie argues that (at least in typical, paradigm cases) perceptual 
demonstrative <F(that)>-beliefs are justified because they’re strongly justified. However, 
Dickie isn’t concerned with intentions at this point, but with another kind of motivational 
state she calls “needs” (introduced above). So Dickie modifies the above definition of strong 
justification by intention as follows. The behaviour of a subject S is strongly justified by need 
iff, for some Φ: 6 
(A) S needs to Φ. 
(B) That need determines how S behaves. 
(C) S is skilled at satisfying the need, so that S’s behaviour is a reliable means towards S 
Φ-ing. 
With a bit of simplification and omission of (for present purposes irrelevant) detail, the 
instances of (A)-(C) relevant to the justification of perceptual demonstrative <F(that)>-
beliefs are: 
(A*) S needs to represent external things. 
(B*) That need determines that S forms a body of <F(that)>-beliefs in response to 
perceptual processing. 
5 This is an adaptation of Dickie’s official formulation on p94. 
6 This is an adaptation of Dickie’s official formulation on p102. 
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(C*) S is skilled at representing external things, so that S forming a body of <F(that)>-
beliefs in response to perceptual processing is a reliable means towards S 
representing external things. 
From (A*)-(C*) and the definition of strong justification by need, Dickie concludes:7 
(D*) S’s body of <F(that)>-beliefs formed in response to perceptual processing are 
strongly justified because they are formed by S implementing a skilful strategy that 
reliably leads to fulfilment of S’s need to represent external things. 
However, (D*) does not follow. What follows is not that S’s <F(that)>-beliefs themselves are 
strongly justified. It follows only that S’s forming a body of beliefs in response to perceptual 
input is strongly justified. That process or activity of belief-formation in response to 
perceptual input is what’s strongly justified by the need to represent, not the beliefs that 
result from it; at least, not without further argument. So there is a missing step in Dickie’s 
argument. She needs an argument from (a) belief-forming behaviour that is a skilful means 
towards satisfaction of need, to (b) epistemic justification of the beliefs that result from that 
behaviour. What is that argument? 
One suggestion is that I’m being overly literal here. Dickie’s discussion is couched in terms of 
strong justification of a belief-forming activity. But we could perhaps reformulate in terms 
of strong justification of believing itself, rather than merely of an activity leading to belief. 
We could then replace (A*)-(C*) with:  
(A!) S needs to represent external things. 
(B!) That need determines that S believes <F(that)> in response to perceptual 
processing. 
(C!) S is skilled at representing external things, so that S believing <F(that)> in response 
to perceptual processing is a reliable means towards S representing external things. 
(A!)-(C!) and the definition of strong justification entail: 
(D!) S’s believing <F(that)> in response to perceptual processing is strongly justified 
because it results from S implementing a skilful strategy that reliably leads to 
fulfilment of S’s need to represent external things. 
We now have a valid argument that uses the definition of strong justification to conclude 
that S’s perceptual demonstrative beliefs formed in response to perceptual input are (at 
7 (D*) is an adaptation of Dickie’s principle 4 on p 129. 
                                                     
  5
least in typical cases) strongly justified. However, this modified approach overgenerates 
justification. 
Any old perceptual demonstrative belief formed in response to perceptual input can be 
seen as part of a skilful strategy for representing external things. Suppose there’s an orange 
on the table before me, viewing conditions are normal, and no funny business is afoot. One 
way for me to satisfy my need to represent external things is by forming the perceptual 
demonstrative belief <Orange(that)>. A different way is by believing one of the following 
instead: <¬Orange(that)> or <Blue(that)>. Each of these beliefs represents an external thing, 
namely the orange to which my perceptual demonstrative <that> refers. Yet only the first 
should be justified by my perceiving the (orange) orange. Although the need to represent 
external things is satisfied by any belief I form about the orange, regardless of what 
properties I predicate of it, justified belief is more demanding. If skilful satisfaction of the 
need to represent external things sufficed for justification of the resulting beliefs, then any 
perceptual demonstrative belief formed on the basis of perception would count as justified, 
irrespective of whether one believed the object to be as perception presents it; justification 
would require only that one be skilled at forming beliefs in response to perception, not that 
one be skilled at matching character of belief with character of perception. This alternative 
account of how perception justifies perceptual demonstrative belief therefore 
overgenerates justification. 
A potential solution is close at hand: the need to represent external things is really the need 
to represent external things as they really are; it is the need to represent truly. This resolves 
the problem because satisfaction of this need in response to perceptual input does indeed 
require that how objects are perceptually presented matches how one believes them to be. 
What this suggests is that, if strong justification by need is to explain reference for 
perceptual demonstratives, the need to represent cannot be the need merely to be engaged 
in representation that Dickie’s presentation suggests it to be. The goal of belief-formation in 
response to perception is not just to have any old cognitive perspective on what’s out there. 
The goal is an accurate mental representation of our surroundings. Moreover, accurate 
mental representation occupies a practical role that mere representation of external things 
does not: actions guided by accurate representation are ceteris paribus more likely than 
those guided by mere representation to satisfy the agent’s preferences and desires. For 
example, if I desire an orange and I represent that thing on the table – which, as it happens, 
is an orange – as an orange, I am ceteris paribus more likely to reach for it and thereby 
satisfy my desire, than if I represent it as something other than an orange. The practical 
utility of accurate representation may thus be used to explain why we possess a need to 
accurately represent, whereas it is unclear what practical use is served by a mere need to 
represent external things without regard for accuracy, or why we should possess such a 
thing. 
